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Bankruptcy
by The Honorable W.H. Drake, Jr.*
and
Christopher S. Strickland"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Undeniably, 1998 proved to be an important year for bankruptcy in
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, with the circuit ultimately
producing a total of fourteen opinions having material bearing upon the
debt relief process. In keeping with the cosmopolitan nature of
bankruptcy practice, these decisions involved the court's performance of
diversified tasks, ranging from the interpretation of intricate Bankruptcy
Code provisions, to the construction of governing requirements from the
Uniform Commercial Code, and the resolution of potential conflicts
between the bankruptcy process and various constitutional or state law
provisions. Provided below is an overview of each decision rendered
during the 1998 calender year.
II.

LEVINE V. WEISSING

The Eleventh Circuit began its bankruptcy jurisprudence for the year
in Levine v. Weissing (In re Levine)' by clarifying the extent to which a
debtor's prepetition conversion of nonexempt assets into assets exempt
from his or her bankruptcy estate subsequently may be avoided as a
fraudulent transfer. The debtors in Levine filed a voluntary petition for
relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in 1991.
Shortly thereafter, the trustee for their estate filed a complaint pursuant

* United States Bankruptcy Judge, Northern District of Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1954; L.L.B. 1956). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Formerly a law clerk of Judge Drake's, Mr. Strickland is an associate with the firm
of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky and Walker LLP, practicing in that firm's corporate lending
and bankruptcy practice groups.
1. 134 F.3d 1046 (lth Cir. 1998).
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to 11 U.S.C. § 5442 and Florida Statute section 726.105,' seeking to set
aside as fraudulent the transfer of approximately $440,000 in purchased
annuities exempted from the claims of creditors under Florida law, to
the extent that such purchases were made in an effort to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors.4
Finding that there were not two distinct, identifiable parties acting as
transferor and transferee in the subject transaction, and therefore, that
there had been no transfer of funds which could be set aside as
fraudulent, the bankruptcy court initially dismissed the trustee's
complaint.' In doing so, the bankruptcy court opined that "because the

Debtors still retain control and ownership of the assets acquired with
funds they obtained from disposition of their nonexempt assets.., the
fact that this conversion effectively removed the former assets from the
reach of the creditors is of no consequence."'
The district court
thereafter reversed the bankruptcy court's order of dismissal, however,
concluding that there had been such a transfer, and furthermore opining
that the trustee had stated a cause of action under 11 U.S.C. § 544 and
Florida Statute section 726.105. 7

2.

The Bankruptcy Code provides, in relevant part:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without
regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers
of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred
by the debtor that is voidable by-(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor
at the time of the commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and
with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on
a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a
creditor exists; (2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to such
credit, and execution against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied as such time,
whether or not such a creditor exists; or (3) a bona fide purchaser of real property,
other than fixtures, from the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such
transfer to be perfected, that obtains status of a bonafide purchaser and has
perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or
not such a purchaser exists.
11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
3. Likewise, Florida law provides that:
[a] transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor,
whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation
... [w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.
FLA. STAT. ch. 726.105 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
4. 134 F.3d at 1048.
5. Id.
6. Id. (citing In re Levine, 139 B.R. 551, 553 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992)).
7. Id.
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On remand, the bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing to
ascertain whether the challenged annuities had been purchased with
fraudulent intent.' Noting that the debtors had discussed the exempt
status of annuities with an estate-planning lawyer while anticipating the
entry of a substantial court judgment against them, and that they
purchased the subject annuity contracts within a short period of time
thereafter, the court found such fraudulent intent indeed to have existed
and set aside the annuities purchase on that basis.9 This decision was
affirmed summarily by the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.10
Applying Florida law, the Eleventh Circuit explained that an
individual who purchases an annuity remains the technical owner of the
asset, but he does not retain total control over that asset and does not
have unfettered access to such property.1 ' As such, when they purchased the subject annuities, the debtors did in fact "transfer" assets
from nonexempt to exempt status. 12 Furthermore, as the court
clarified, the avoidance of such transfers does not fall under the
thirty-day limitations period governing objections to claimed exemptions,
but instead shall be timely filed under the two-year statute of limitations
governing exercises of the trustee's avoidance powers. 3 Otherwise
finding no clear error in the bankruptcy court's factual determination
that the debtors had purchased exempt annuities with an intent to
hinder or defraud known creditors, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.' 4

8.
9.

Id.
Id. at 1049.

10. Id.

,.

11. Id. at 1049-50.
12. Id. at 1050.
13. Id. at 1053. As the court noted:
The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure mandate that objections to listing of
property to be claimed as exempt must be filed within thirty days after the
creditors' meeting. FED. R. BANK. P. 4003. As previously noted, however, the
trustee in this action does not seek to contest the exemptions per se; rather, this
is an adversary action filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544, which permits the trustee
to "avoid any transfer of the property of the debtor.... ." 11 U.S.C. § 544(a). The
Bankruptcy Code provides that an adversary action filed under this provision may
be filed within two years after the entry of the order for relief. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 546(a)(1)(A). It is undisputed that the trustee has complied with the two-year
limitation on the filing of this action. Having determined that the statute of
limitations governing objections to exemptions does not control this case, we
conclude that the trustee's action to contest the transfer of funds is not time-barred.
134 F.3d at 1053.
14. Id. at 1054.
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MILLER V. FLORIDA MINING & MATERIALS

In its second bankruptcy opinion of the year, Miller v. FloridaMining
& Materials (In re A.W. & Associates, Inc.), 5 the Eleventh Circuit
resolved questions regarding the need to consider industry standards in
determining whether disputed payments fall within the "ordinary course
of business" exception to the trustee's preference avoidance powers.
Pursuant to its operation as a construction company, the debtors in A. W.
& Associates had regularly purchased concrete and concrete-related
products from Florida Mining & Materials. Historical dealings between
the parties also had often involved the debtor's failure to make timely
payments on the Florida Mining account, and numerous checks issued
to that company by the debtor had subsequently been dishonored for
insufficient funds. Indeed, delinquent and dishonored payments
appeared to have become a matter of custom between the debtor and
Florida Mining."6
In keeping with that course of dealing, on March 5, 1993, the debtor
tendered a $6,131.05 check to Florida Mining in payment of certain
invoices dated January 29, February 1, February 2, February 3, and
February 4, 1993. The check was initially dishonored, but was
resubmitted and paid on March 10, 1993. As among the various invoices
which were satisfied in that transaction, payment upon the January 29
invoice came late, but all other
payments upon the subject invoices were
17
received in a timely fashion.
Subsequent to these payments, the debtor sought relief under the
Bankruptcy Code on May 3, 1993. The trustee appointed to administer
the debtor's estate thereafter filed a complaint in the bankruptcy court
seeking to avoid the March 10 payment as a preferential transfer under
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)."8 As a defense to the trustee's action, Florida

15. 136 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1998).
16. Id. at 1440.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1440-41. A bankruptcy trustee may avoid pre-petition transfers of estate
property under the following terms:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-(1) to or for the benefit of a
creditor; (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made-(A) on or
within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B) between ninety
days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at
the time of such transfer was an insider; and (5) that enables such creditor to
receive more than such creditor would receive if-(A) the case were a case under
Chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had not been made; and (C) such creditor
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Mining responded that the payment had been made in the ordinary
course of business, and therefore, it was exempt from avoidance under
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). 19
Following a trial on the matter, the bankruptcy court concluded the

transfer was made in the ordinary course of business between the
parties and was not the result of extraordinary collection efforts.2" In
a key point of its analysis, however, the court ruled as a matter of law
that the section 547(c)(2) exception depends "upon the debtor's internal
operations and the circumstances of the transactions in question, not
industry standards."21 In an unreported decision, the district court
affirmed this legal conclusion, as well as the findings of fact attending
the bankruptcy court's application of section 547(c)(2).22
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first noted the parties' stipulation
that the debtor's payment to Florida Mining qualified as a preferential
transfer under section 547(b).23 Thus, the appeal's outcome depended
solely upon whether section 547(c)(2) applied, and specifically, whether
courts must consider industry standards in determining that defense's
application.24 This question, the court observed, was one of first
impression for the Eleventh Circuit.25

received payment of. such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this
title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
19. 136 F.3d at 1441. This section provides that a trustee may not avoid a transfer:
(2) to the extent that such transfer was (A) in payment of a debt incurred by the
debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee; (B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; and (C) made according to ordinary business terms.
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). This exception operates as an affirmative defense; a creditor
asserting that a transfer falls within section 547(c)(2) bears the burden of proving each of
the three elements. Id. § 547(g).
20. 136 F.3d at 1441.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1441-42.
25. Id. In a prior case, the Eleventh Circuit had discussed whether a debtor's
payments by cashier checks to a creditor had been made in the ordinary course of business,
therein noting that resolution of the issue "turns on the specific events surrounding
[debtor's] payments to [creditor]." See Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig Oil Co.), 785
F.2d 1563, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1986). While acknowledging that dicta from Craig Oil
suggests that a bankruptcy court may focus exclusively on the relationship between the
parties, the panel distinguished that case, noting that "[blecause the disputed payment in
CraigOil was extraordinary in the course of business between the creditor and the debtor,
this Court did not need to determine whether a creditor must withstand an additional
inquiry into the relevant industry standards to establish the affirmative defense provided
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As the panel in A. W. & Associates noted, however, other circuits had
considered the issue, reaching a consensus that the language of section
547(c)(2)(C) requires bankruptcy courts to consult industry standards in
classifying a disputed transfer.26 Thus, the court joined in the nearly
unanimous view that such an examination of industry standards forms
a necessary part of the application of section 547(c)(2)(C). 2 To the
extent they depended upon a ruling otherwise, the decisions of the
bankruptcy and district courts were overturned.28
IV. KEY BANK OF MAINE V. JOST

Also in the 1998 term, in Key Bank of Maine v. Jost (In re Jost)2s the
circuit addressed issues regarding a creditor's objection to the debtor's
allegedly fraudulent asset exemption. In July 1991 the debtor had
purchased a home in Florida, using proceeds from the sale of her prior
home in Missouri as a downpayment. Roughly three months later, she
satisfied the $138,000 mortgage on the Florida residence, using
payments she had received from her brother-in-law under a promissory
note. When she subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection on April 6,
1994, the debtor claimed an exemption in the home valued at
$184,000.30 Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b), 3 ' a creditor of the

by § 547(c)(2)." 136 F.3d at 1442 (citing Craig Oil, 785 F.2d at 1565, 1566). Therefore, the
court in A. W. & Associates viewed the issue before it as one of first impression,
notwithstanding CraigOil. Id.
26. 136 F.3d at 1442 (citing Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78
F.3d 30, 41 (2d Cir. 1996); Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded
Acoustical Prods., Inc.), 18 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 1994); Advo-System, Inc. v. Maxway
Corp., 37 F.3d 1044, 1048 (4th Cir. 1994); Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp. (In re Fred Hawes
Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d 239, 244 (6th Cir. 1992); In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029,
1032-33 (7th Cir. 1993); Jones v. United Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka
Springs, Arkansas, Inc.), 9 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir. 1993); Mordy v. Chemcarb, Inc. (In re
Food Catering & Hous., Inc.), 971 F.2d 396,398 (9th Cir. 1992); Clark v. Balcor Real Estate
Fin., Inc. (In re Meridith Hoffman Partners), 12 F.3d 1549, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993)).
27. Id. at 1442-43.
28. Id. at 1443.
29. 136 F.3d 1455 (11th Cir. 1998).
30. Id. at 1456-57. Pursuant to the following terms, the Florida Constitution provides
an unlimited homestead exemption:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no
judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of
taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase,
improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other
labor performed on the realty, the following property owned by a natural person:
(1) a homestead...
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1).
31. The Bankruptcy Rules provide, in relevant part:
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estate objected to her claimed exemption in the home, alleging that the
debtor had purchased her Florida home, an exempt asset, with
nonexempt assets with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud her
creditors.3 2
In overruling the creditor's objection, the bankruptcy court concluded
that the creditor had failed to establish a prima facie case for disallowing the debtor's homestead exemption because the record was
devoid of any evidence of... threat of levy, attachment, garnishment,
or execution on a judgment just prior to the debtor's purchase of the
Florida homestead [and] there was no credible evidence produced to
indicate that the Debtor was being pursued by creditors at the time of
the purchase of the disputed homestead property.3"
The creditor thereafter moved for rehearing, which the bankruptcy court
denied.34 The creditor then appealed to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment.3 "
The creditor's further appeal to the Eleventh Circuit framed the core
point of the legal dispute as to whether a claimed Florida homestead
exemption may be challenged on the basis that the subject home has
been purchased with nonexempt assets in an attempt to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors in violation of Florida Statute section 726.105. a8
Nevertheless, the panel in Jost found it unnecessary either to resolve
that question of state law or to certify it for determination to the Florida
Supreme Court; such legal questions would have to be decided only if the
bankruptcy court had made a finding of fact that the debtor's purchase

The ,trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed as
exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors held
pursuant to Rule 2003(a) or the filing of any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules unless, within such period, further time is granted by the court.
Copies of the objections shall be delivered or mailed to the trustee and to the
person filing the list and the attorney for such person.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).
32. 136 F.3d at 1457.
33. Id. (quoting lower court's unreported decision).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1457-58.
36. Id. at 1458. That statutory provision directs:
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made
or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the
obligation: (a) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the

debtor;
FLA. STAT. ch. 726.105.

898

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

of her home and/or her prepayment of the home mortgage were in fact
made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud some creditor.3 7 Because
the lower court had yet to determine such issues, the panel remanded
the case with instructions that the bankruptcy court should hold further
proceedings and make detailed findings upon whether the debtor's
purchase of her Florida home and/or her prepayment of the home
mortgage constituted transfers made with an intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any creditor in violation of Florida law."8

V. UNITED STATES V. GILBERT
In another of its 1998 decisions, United States v. Gilbert,39 the
Eleventh Circuit resolved a dispute over the statute of limitations
applicable to bankruptcy crimes. Defendant had been the president and
sole stockholder of Corporate Air Limited, Inc. ("CAL"). In 1985, CAL
contracted to purchase a piece of real estate. Before closing the sale of
the property to CAL, defendant formed a second corporation, Isle of
Fantasy, Inc. ("IOF"), for the purpose of taking title to the property. IOF
paid for the property using funds received from CAL. The funds
provided by CAL represented either loans to IOF or an anticipated
interest in the real estate.4 °
In 1987, CAL filed a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The petition included the necessary schedules of
CAL's assets, but did not disclose any interest in connection with the
aforementioned property. Upon the case's conversion to one of liquidation under Chapter 7, the trustee discovered CAL's interest in the
property.4
Following referral of the matter to the United States Attorney,
defendant was indicted in July 1996 for concealing assets of the
bankrupt's estate.42 Defendant then moved to dismiss the indictment

37. 136 F.3d at 1459. Even if the bankruptcy court had made such a finding of fact,
however, the court of appeals noted that it still would not have affirmed. Because the
bankruptcy court had declined to consider admissible evidence from the debtor's testimony
at the section 341 meeting and during her Rule 2004 examination, any fact findings

thereby produced would have been unsustainable. Id.
38. Id. at 1459.
39.

136 F.3d 1451 (11th Cir. 1998).

40. Id. at 1452-53.
41. Id. at 1453.
42. Id. Section 152 provides, in relevant part, that:
[a] person who... knowingly and fraudulently conceals from a custodian, trustee,

marshal, or other officer of the court charged with the control or custody of
property, or, in connection with a case under title 11, from creditors or the United

States Trustee, any property belonging to the estate of a debtor... shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
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as barred by the statute of limitations.' That motion was denied and
defendant was convicted, at which point he pursued an appeal."
The court of appeals began analyzing the issue by noting that statutes
of limitations normally begin to run when the crime is complete.45 In
cases of asset concealment, however, Congress has directed that such
acts "shall be deemed to be a continuing offense until the debtor shall
have been finally discharged or a discharge denied, and the period of
limitations shall not begin to run until such final discharge or denial of
discharge."'
In the case sub judice the court observed that discharge was no longer
possible when CAL, a corporate debtor, converted its case from Chapter
11 to Chapter 7.47 As a result, a "final discharge or denial of discharge"
would never be given to that debtor.4 Considering the government's
position, that no statute of limitations applies to such situations, to be
untenable, the panel in Gilbert applied a contextual reading of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3284, finding that the period of limitation runs from the date of the
event when discharge becomes impossible. 49 Because this point of
impossibility was reached at conversion, the statute of limitations began
to run at that time, meaning that defendant was immune from
prosecution. 0
VI. HALL MOTORS, INC. V. LEWIS
The fifth opinion handed down by the Eleventh Circuit in 1998, Hall
Motors, Inc. v. Lewis (In re Lewis),51 addressed the extent to which
debtors' rights in property foreclosed prepetition may be resurrected
upon filing. The debtors in Lewis purchased a used car from Hall
Motors in August 1992 in a seller-financed transaction. As a consequence of existing defaults in payment, Hall repossessed the car two
days prior to the debtors' filing a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 13
of the Code. When the debtors proposed to pay the creditor sixty-two
cents on the dollar on the outstanding secured balance that they owed,
Hall refused to return the automobile. At that point, the debtors filed

18 U.S.C. § 152.
43. 136 F.3d at 1453.

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3284 (1994)).
Id. at 1454 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1994)).

48. Id.
49. Id. at 1454-55.
50. Id. at 1455.
51. 137 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 1998).
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an adversary proceeding for turnover of the vehicle pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 542(a).52
Applying Alabama law, the bankruptcy court concluded that the
debtors had both title and a right of redemption in the repossessed
vehicle. 3 As a result, the bankruptcy court found the vehicle to be
property of the estate and ordered its expeditious return to the
debtors.54 Hall appealed, and, after holding that Alabama law merely
provided the debtors with a right of redemption in the repossessed
vehicle, the district court found that the vehicle did not constitute an
asset of the estate which would be subject to compulsory turnover.55
Therefore, it reversed the bankruptcy court's order.5" The debtors then
appealed the district court's holding."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first noted that the vehicle's status as
property of the estate vel non turned on questions of federal law.58 At
the same time, however, the nature and existence of the debtor's rights
59
in such property had to be determined by reference to state law.
Accordingly, the court looked to Alabama law to determine the debtors'
interest in the repossessed vehicle.6"
Thus, pursuant to state law, the debtors lost both possessory rights in
the vehicle and title thereto upon its repossession.6 1 Likewise, the

52. Id. at 1281-82. Section 542(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity, other than a
custodian, in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the
trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that the debtor
may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and
account for such property or the value of such property, unless such property is
of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1993).
53. 137 F.3d at 1282.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1283 (citing Southtrust Bank Ala. v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 883 F.3d 991,
995 (11th Cir. 1989)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1284. The Eleventh Circuit opined:
Both the Lewises and the bankruptcy court in [Matter of Turner, 209 B.R. 558
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997)] list many logical reasons why a debtor upon default
should lose only his or her right to possess the secured personalty. See Turner,
209 B.R. at 564-68. Nevertheless, their view as to what Alabama's law should be
simply does not comport with what the law is. Accordingly, we conclude that, at
the commencement of the Lewises' second Chapter 13 case, Elgin Lewis did not
retain title, possession or any other functionally equivalent ownership interest in
the repossessed automobile.
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vehicle ceased to be property of the estate from and after that time. 2
While the debtors did retain a right of redemption pursuant to Alabama's version of the Uniform Commercial Code,63 this right, standing
alone, was not enough to render the vehicle itself property of the
estate.64
Furthermore, the debtors' Chapter 13 estate held no greater rights in
the vehicle than the debtors did, meaning that the estate could only
redeem the vehicle by tendering fulfillment of all secured obligations."
Finding that a proposal to pay sixty-two cents on the dollar over an
extended period of time did not reflect a proper act of redemption under
Alabama law, the panel in Lewis saw no basis for ordering Hall to
return the vehicle.66 Thus, it affirmed the district court's ruling.67
VII.

GEORGIA V. BURKE

In Georgia v. Burke (In re Burke)," the Eleventh Circuit entered the
fray of one of bankruptcy's most contentious debates in recent time-the
impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.

Id.
62. Id.
63. Alabama law provides, in relevant part:
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a
contract for its disposition under Section 7-9-504 or before the obligation has been
discharged under subsection (2) of Section 7-9-505, the debtor or any other secured
party may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral
by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral, as well as the
expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party in retaking, holding and
preparing the collateral for disposition, in arranging for the sale, and to the extent
provided in the agreement and not prohibited by law, his reasonable attorneys'
fees and legal expenses.
ALA. CODE § 7-9-506 (1993).
64. 137 F.3d at 1284 (citing In re Smith, 85 F.3d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir. 1996)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1285. It should be noted, however, that a different outcome might be reached
had Alabama law not controlled. As one court has noted in the wake of the Hall decision:
Honda argues that the outcome of this case is controlled by the recent Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals decision.., in Hall v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 137 F.3d 1280
(11th Cir. 1998). [The court concludes, however,] that Georgia law applies with
respect to a car repossessed in Georgia when the parties have not specified in a
contract that another state's law would apply to determine rights after repossession ....

The court finds that ...

under Georgia law, upon repossession, a

creditor acquires the right of possession, but not
debtor retains a title interest in the vehicle ....
that this interest is sufficient to make the vehicle
In re Littleton, 220 B.R. 710, 714-15 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
67. 137 F.3d at 1285.
68. 146 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 1998).

absolute title. As a result, a
Furthermore, the court finds
property of the estate.
1998).
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Florida69 upon a state's immunity from compelled participation in the
bankruptcy process. The debtors in Burke sought joint relief under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in August 1992. The Georgia
Department of Revenue filed a proof of claim that included an unsecured
priority claim of $12,437.40 for unpaid state income taxes covering the
tax years 1980-84, a claim later adjudged to be a general unsecured
claim.70 Upon the case's conversion to Chapter 7, the bankruptcy court
entered a general discharge order releasing the debtors from liability for
all dischargeable debts. 71 However, neither the debtors nor the State
of Georgia requested a determination of whether the taxes that accrued
in 1980-84 had been discharged. 2
In May 1994, three months after the entry of a discharge in the
debtors' favor, the Georgia Department of Revenue wrote them a letter
demanding payment of the foregoing taxes and warning that nonpayment could result in collection by garnishment, attachment, or levy. On
receipt of this demand, the debtors reopened their Chapter 7 case and
filed an adversary action against the State of Georgia, alleging that the
Department of Revenue violated the discharge injunction of 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(a) by sending the demand letter for unpaid state income taxes.73
After its motion for summary judgment was denied, the State of Georgia
moved to dismiss the debtors' action, relying on Seminole and arguing
sought by the debtors was barred by the Eleventh
that the relief
74
Amendment.

69.
70.

517 U.S. 44 (1996).
146 F.3d at 1315.

71.

Id.

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that, "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. To the extent
the Eleventh Amendment "bars suits which seek either damages or ijunctive relief against'
a State, an 'arm of the State,' its instrumentalities, or its agencies," Franceschiv. Schwartz,
57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995), in order for a suit for damages to be brought against a
State, either that sovereign must have waived its right to Eleventh Amendment immunity
or the United States Congress must have abrogated that immunity through a valid exercise
of power. See generally Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99
(1984).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole, the latter appeared to be the case.
Bankruptcy Code section 106 offered a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate state
immunity within the bankruptcy context, and the amenability of the states to bankruptcy
court litigation, therefore, seemed beyond contradiction. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (Supp.
1998); see also Sparkman v. Florida Dep't of Rev. (In re York-Hannover Dev.), 181 B.R. 271,
278 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1995) (noting that"Congress made its intention to abrogate sovereign
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The bankruptcy court initially declined to address this issue, instead
relying on its finding that the State of Georgia had waived its sovereign
immunity by filing a proof of claim against the debtors' bankruptcy
estate.75 In denying a subsequent motion by the State of Georgia to
alter or amend the previous order, however, the bankruptcy court also
concluded that section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally
expressed congressional intent to abrogate states' sovereign immunity for
violations of the discharge injunction of section 524, and that section
106(a) furthermore represented a valid exercise of congressional power
under the Fourteenth Amendment.76 In an alternate holding, the
bankruptcy court concluded that any existing immunity from suit had
been waived by the State of Georgia's filing of a proof of claim against
the debtors' estate.7 7 The State of Georgia then appealed to the district

immunity 'unmistakably clear' in § 106" and finding such abrogative measures to fall
within the plenary authority granted by the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause). In
Seminole, however, the Court essentially held that Congress's power to abrogate immunity
only may be exercised pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and provisions
of abrogation that are based upon Article I of the Constitution, such as Bankruptcy Code
section 106, consequently do nothing to diminish the protection that each of the states
enjoys under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1125-32. Thus, the
amenability of states to bankruptcy court jurisdiction became a matter of great uncertainty.
75. 146 F.3d at 1315 (citing In re Burke, 200 B.R. 282, 287-88 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996)).
76. Id. (citing In re Burke, 203 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996) (reasoning that in
light of Seminole the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I did not empower Congress to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment, but that abrogation could be accomplished under the Fourteenth
Amendment)).
77. Id. at 1315-16. A companion case to the Burke appeal turned upon the same
questions of law, and received disposition under the same opinion. In that bankruptcy
proceeding the debtors, husband and wife, filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code in December 1994. The Georgia Department of Revenue filed a proof of
claim for state income taxes. Thereafter, in October 1995, the Department of Revenue
issued an "Official Assessment and Demand for Payment" against the debtors and then
issued a "Collection Notice," demanding immediate payment of the taxes and warning that
nonpayment would result in collection by levy, garnishment, or attachment. Subsequently,
the debtors filed an adversary action against the State of Georgia, alleging the collection
attempts violated the automatic stay prescribed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. The State of Georgia
moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity and,
alternatively, that as a matter of law it had not violated the automatic stay. The
bankruptcy court found both grounds to be without merit and denied the motion. In re
Headrick, 200 B.R. 963, 965-69 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996) (adopting the same reasoning as in
In re Burke, and thus finding that the State of Georgia's immunity was abrogated because
section 106(a) was enacted by Congress pursuant to a valid exercise of authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment, or alternatively, that the State of Georgia waived its immunity
by filing a proof of claim against the debtors). The State of Georgia's motion to alter or
amend the previous order denying summary judgment was denied. In re Headrick, 203
B.R. 805 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996). This prompted an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. 146
F.3d at 1316.

904

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

court, which held that section 106(a) validly abrogates Georgia's
sovereign immunity because "the bankruptcy code creates privileges and

immunities enforceable by Congress under [section] 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."7"
In addressing the State of Georgia's subsequent appeal from the order
of the district court, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought against a state by its own
citizens but pointed out two well-established exceptions to such
immunity: (1) a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity
and consent to suit in federal court, and (2) Congress can abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity if it unequivocally expresses an
intent to abrogate state immunity and acts pursuant to a valid exercise
of power.79 On the former question, the panel in Burke found guidance
in Gardner v.New Jersey,80 in which the Supreme Court found a state
waived its sovereign immunity by filing a proof of claim and voluntarily
participating in the bankruptcy process."1
Deeming the logic of
Gardner still controlling of the ultimate question before it, the court
ruled that the State of Georgia had waived its sovereign immunity by
filing a proof of claim and that such waiver extended to the bankruptcy
court's enforcement of its discharge injunction and automatic stay,
respectively.8 2

78. 146 F.3d at 1316.
79. Id. at 1316-17.
80. 329 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1947).
81. 146 F.3d at 1317-18. At the outset of its analysis, the panel in Burke cautioned
that nothing found therein should be construed as an application of 11 U.S.C. § 106(b),
which provides:
[a] governmental unit that has filed a proof of claim in the case is deemed to have
waived sovereign immunity with respect to a claim against such governmental
unit that is property of the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence out of which the claim of such governmental unit arose.
11 U.S.C. § 106(b). Rather, the court assumed, arguendo, that the State of Georgia's
Eleventh Amendment immunity had not been validly abrogated by section 106(a) and went
so far as to concede that "the power to define waiver can become the functional equivalent
of the power to abrogate." 146 F.3d at 1317. Nonetheless, in dicta, the court did suggest
that section 106(b)'s terms may present a correct restatement of the jurisprudence
regarding Eleventh Amendment waiver. Id.
82. 146 F.3d at 1319-20. Having so disposed of the matter before it, the panel found
it unnecessary to address whether section 106(a) validly abrogates states' sovereign
immunity as an exercise of Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 1317.
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SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. BILZERIAN

Also in 1998, in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Bilzerian (In re
8 the Eleventh Circuit provided further definition of that
Bilzerian),"
brand of conduct warranting exception from discharge under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A). In Bilzerian the debtor was convicted in 1989 for nine
counts of securities fraud for violations of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,4 the general antifraud provision of the securities laws. In the wake of that conviction, the SEC also brought civil
proceedings to force disgorgement of the debtor's fraudulently obtained
profits.8 5 Based upon his criminal conviction, the District Court for the
District of Columbia found the debtor to be collaterally estopped from
challenging the civil action and ordered the debtor to disgorge approximately $33 million, plus interest.8 6 The D.C. Circuit upheld the
judgment of disgorgement on appeal.8 7
During the foregoing litigation, however, the debtor had filed a
petition for bankruptcy relief. Thus, when the disgorgement award was
upheld, the SEC sought to except that right to payment from discharge
in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), arguing that it represented a debt for money obtained by fraud.8 The SEC also contended that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel compelled a decision in its favor.8 9
The bankruptcy court disagreed, holding that the previous judgments
against the debtor did not include the requisite findings of "reliance" and
"consequent loss," as required by Bankruptcy Code section
523(a)(2)(A). 9" On appeal, the district court reversed that decision,
finding all necessary elements for collateral estoppel of such issues to be
clear from the securities litigation record. 9
When the debtor sought appeal from the district court's order
reversing the bankruptcy court, the Eleventh Circuit first found that
applications of section 523(a)(2)(A) require the traditional elements of
common law fraud: (1) that the debtor made a false representation to
deceive the creditor, (2) that the creditor relied on the misrepresentation,

83. 153 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1998).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Supp. III 1997).
85. 153 F.3d at 1280.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1281 (citing SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
88. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1993) (excepting from discharge any debt "for
money... to the extent obtained by... false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud").
89. 153 F.2d at 1281.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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(3) that the reliance was justified, and (4) that the creditor sustained a
loss as a result of the misrepresentation. 92 Finding without question
that the judgment at issue qualified as a "debt" within the meaning of
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), the court of appeals construed the issue before
it as one of whether a criminal conviction for securities fraud, combined
with a civil disgorgement judgment in favor of the SEC, satisfies the
requirements of collateral estoppel for determining "fraud" under section
523(a)(2)(A).93 This question, in turn, depended upon whether the
criminal conviction and disgorgement judgment satisfied the collateral
estoppel requirement of identical issues having been actually litigated
and determined in a means critical and necessary to the preceding
judgment. 94 Specifically, the court in Bilzerian found it necessary to
determine whether findings of "loss" and "actual reliance" were critical
to the previous litigation which was resolved in favor of the SEC. 9
With regard to loss, the court of appeals noted that the debtor had
based an appeal of the disgorgement order upon the contention that no
one was injured by his fraudulent schemes." Although deeming the
presence of such injury irrelevant to the question at hand, the D.C.
Circuit specifically found that "others were injured by the debtor's
deceptions-investors paid the debtor an inflated price for his stocks
because of his illegal actions."97 In view of this unequivocal statement
by the D.C. Circuit, the panel in Bilzerian concluded that the district
court properly deemed the debtor to be collaterally estopped from
challenging whether a loss had occurred.9"
Although noting that some courts have not required proof of actual
reliance in SEC enforcement actions, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless
found the causation requirement of "materiality" in Rule 10b(5)
sufficiently analogous to the requirement for actual reliance under
section 523(a)(2)(A).
Such an interpretation, the court reasoned,
justifiably reflected an expansive view of "debts obtained by fraud"
because "'the malefic debtor may not hoist the Bankruptcy Code as

92.

Id. (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 73-75 (1995)).

93. Id.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
153-54

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
(1972)

1281-82.
1282.

1283.
1282 & n.19 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
(causation in fact presumed if plaintiffs claim based on defendant's failure

to disclose material information); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-47 (1988)
(fraud-on-the-market theory permits plaintiffs to rely on integrity of open, well-developed
markets rather than requiring proof of direct reliance)).
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protection from the full consequences of fraudulent conduct. ' "" Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that a
discharge of the debtor's obligations under the disgorgement order was
proper. 10'
IX.

KEATING v. SPANGLER

Another bankruptcy decision from the circuit's 1998 calendar year,
Keating v. Spangler (In re XYZ Options, Inc.), °2 required the court of
appeals to determine whether a bankruptcy court can look behind a prior
consent judgment to examine potential fraud against creditors. The
debtor in XYZ Options had entered into a contract with Machinery Trade
Company ("Machinery Trade") in 1998, whereby it agreed to build a
plant in Iraq for the manufacture of carbide cutting tools. To secure
payment and performance under the $14,000,000 contract, the agreement required both Machinery Trade and the debtor each to post letters
of credit in the other's favor. Specifically, the contract required
Machinery Trade to produce a $1,400,000 down payment and post a
letter of credit in an amount equal to the remainder due under the
contract. The agreement likewise required that the debtor post two
letters of credit--one letter as a performance bond for approximately
$400,000 and another letter of approximately $1,400,000 to ensure that
Machinery Trade could recover the down payment in the event of a
default. 3
Unable to come up with the required letters of credit themselves,
principals of the debtor approached First Phoenix Capital ("First
Phoenix"), which agreed to arrange financing for the two letters of credit
and to lend the debtor $400,000 in working capital for the project. In
return, the debtor agreed to repay First Phoenix for any draws it made
on the letters of credit and signed a note for the amount of the letters of
credit, plus the working capital loan. The joint agreement also provided
that the debtor would use funds received from the Machinery Trade

100. Id. at 1282 (quoting St. Lavrent, II v. Ambrose, 991 F.2d 672, 680 (11th Cir.
1993)).
101. Id. at 1283. As a supplement to its main conclusion, the panel in Bilzerian also
rejected out of hand the debtor's contention that such a finding of nondischargeability
would violate the Excessive Fines and/or Double Jeopardy clauses of the United States
Constitution, finding such constitutional claims to be "groundless." Id. (citing U.S. CONST.
amends. V & VIII).
102. 154 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998).
103. Id. at 1264.
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contract to collateralize the letters of credit and to eventually remove
First Phoenix from the deal."
Thereafter, progression of the construction project and the business
relationship of the parties severely deteriorated. Litigation ensued in
several different jurisdictions, and the parties ultimately came to resolve
their differences by means of a settlement agreement, the terms of which
were reduced to a consent judgment in an Arizona state court.1"5 The
judgment, rendered in favor of First Phoenix and against the debtor,
totaled approximately $2,300,000, and roughly equaled the sum to be
received
by the debtor's settlement of litigation against a third par1°6
ty.

When the debtor thereafter commenced a bankruptcy case, the trustee
for the estate sued First Phoenix and certain insiders, contending that
the transfer of $2,300,000 in settlement with First Phoenix constituted
a fraudulent transfer and an avoidable preference.' l 7 In turn, First
Phoenix argued that the subject transfer was shielded by the Arizona
consent judgment in its favor to the extent that a bankruptcy court
lacked the power to look behind that judgment's terms.' 8
After withdrawing the reference, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama found that it held sufficient equity
power in bankruptcy to look behind a state court consent judgment
between the debtor and creditors to determine whether a fraudulent
transfer had occurred."0 9 As to the underlying merits of the case,
however, the district court held that the trustee had not raised a
genuine issue of fact regarding his allegations of actual and constructive
fraud under Bankruptcy Code sections 544 and 548.110 The court,
therefore, entered partial summary judgment in favor of the creditors. "

On subsequent appeal by the trustee, the Eleventh Circuit began by
noting the well-established holding of Pepper v. Litton,112 in which the
Supreme Court rejected a claim of res judicata and sustained the power
of a bankruptcy court to look behind a previous state court judgment."' In view of such a clear license, the court of appeals found'no

104.

Id. at 1264-65.

105. Id. at 1266.
106. Id. at 1266-67.
107. Id. at 1267. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.
108. 154 F.3d at 1267.
109.

Id.

110. Id. at 1271.
111. Id.
112. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
113. 154 F.3d at 1267-68 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939)).

BANKRUPTCY

1999]

909

question that the district court had equity power in bankruptcy to look
behind a state court consent judgment between the debtor and its
creditors.114 Thus, it affirmed the district court's decision in this
regard.'15
As to the existence of material questions of fact on the trustee's
avoidance actions, the panel in XYZ Options found the district court in
error."6 In particular, the panel determined that material issues of
fact existed regarding the inflated nature of values assigned by the
consent judgment's terms and whether assets transferred in satisfaction
of the debtor's obligations'thereunder had been diverted." 7 In view of
such material and unanswered questions, summary judgment on claims
of actual or constructive fraud was deemed inappropriate by the XYZ
Options panel, and the district court's ruling was reversed. 1"'
X.

DIONNE V. KEATING

In a companion appeal from the preceding case, Dionne v. Keating (In
re XYZ Options, Inc.),"19 the Eleventh Circuit also found itself compelled to decide whether section 5-116(2) of the Uniform Commercial
Code precludes a valid assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit at
a point when the performance of the conditions of the credit have
already occurred, that is, at a time when the right to payment under the
letter of credit has already been earned. 120 Recall that the debtor
executed a document purporting to assign the Machinery Trade's letter
of credit to First Phoenix at an October 1988 closing of the financing
arrangements, but the debtor did not deliver possession of the letter of
credit at that time. In November 1989, at a time when the debtor still
had possession of the Machinery Trade letter of credit, the issuer of that
letter stopped making payments to the debtor and filed a declaratory
judgment action in federal court for a determination that it was no
longer liable under the letter of credit. 121 On July 21, 1993 the court
entered a memorandum opinion concluding that the debtor had in fact
performed construction work under the contract and had presented
appropriate documentation entitling it to draw on the letter of credit,

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1270-71.
Id. at 1271.
Id.
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1275.
154 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1277.
Id.
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and that the issuer had erroneously refused to honor the debtor's
draws.122 Thus, it was then established that the debtor had performed
the conditions of the letters of credit, that is, that it had earned the right
to payment under the Machinery Trade letter of credit. Subsequently,
in November 1993, First Phoenix acquired a perfected security interest
in the proceeds of the letter of credit to secure obligations, which the
debtor had incurred in connection with financing the construction
project, by taking possession of that letter
in accordance with Uniform
123
Commercial Code section 5-116(2)(a).
Upon the debtor's filing for bankruptcy, the Chapter 7 trustee
challenged First Phoenix's security interest in the proceeds of the letter
of credit.' 24 Having withdrawn reference of the case, the district court
construed section 5-116(2) to permit the assignment of a security interest
in the proceeds of the letter of credit only before performance of the
conditions of the letter of credit.' 2 ' Thus, the district court held the
statute to preclude assignment of a security interest in the proceeds of
the letter of credit if the right to payment under the letter of credit had
already been earned. 2 ' Because the debtor's assignment of a security
interest in the proceeds of the letter of credit was not perfected until
November 1993, at which time the debtor's right to payment under the
letter had already 27
been earned, the district court held that the assign-

ment was invalid.

Noting the silence on the question of post performance assignments in
section 5-116(2), the Eleventh Circuit turned its attention to U.C.C.
section 5-102(3), and its cautionary statement that the existence of a
rule should "not by itself require, imply or negate application of the
same or a converse rule to a situation not provided for." 2 ' In keeping
with this directive, the panel reasoned that it would be inappropriate to
construe section 5-116(2)'s license of preperformance assignment as a
prohibition upon such action in the wake of performance. 129 Indeed,
to the contrary, the court in XYZ Options found section 5-116(2)'s Official
Comment unequivocally provided that a letter of credit "is [to be] treated
like any other contract calling for money to be earned," a strong

122. Id. at 1277-78.
123. Id. at 1278. U.C.C. § 5-116(2)(a) expressly provides that "the assignment is

ineffective until the letter of credit or advice of credit is delivered to the assignee, which
delivery constitutes perfection of the security interest under Article 9."
124. 154 F.3d at 1277.
125. Id. at 1278.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1278-79 (quoting U.C.C. § 5-102(3)).
129. Id. at 1279.
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indication that it should be deemed freely assignable, both before and
after the right to payment has been earned.3 0 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court's ruling to the contrary.'
XI.

CHEMICAL BANK V. FIRST TRUST OF NEW YORK

In September 1998 the Eleventh Circuit, in Chemical Bank v. First
Trust of New York (In re Southeast Banking Corp.),'32 clarified the
vitality of the "rule of explicitness" in the wake of Bankruptcy Code
section 510's passage. Under the terms of a prepetition indenture (the
"Senior Indenture"), the debtor had issued $60 million in principal
amount of unsecured notes (the "Senior Notes"). The Senior Indenture
provided the debtor with a continuing obligation to repay principal and
interest on the Senior Notes and, in the event of a default, obligated the
debtor to pay the entire amount of principal and interest due on the
Senior Notes, including interest until the date of payment upon overdue
principal. To the extent enforceable, the agreement also purportedly
obligated the debtor to pay interest upon the overdue interest at the
same rate specified in the Senior Notes. Finally, the Senior Indenture
provided that in the event of a default, the debtor also would be liable
to the Senior Trustee for reasonable fees and costs of collection,
including attorney fees.'
Under five separate indentures (the "Subordinated Indentures"), the
debtor also issued in excess of $300 million in principal amount of
subordinated notes ("the Subordinated Notes"). Each of the Subordinated Indentures contained language subordinating collection on the
Subordinated Notes to the prior payment in full on the Senior Notes.
The Subordinated Indentures also provided that upon the debtor's
bankruptcy or liquidation, the holders of the Senior Notes would have
to be fully paid before the debtor could make any payment on the
Subordinated Notes, and that all payments otherwise owing to the
holders of the Subordinated Notes must first be paid to the holders of
the Senior Notes. Significantly, however, the Subordinated Indentures
made no specific mention of the issue of postpetition interest or of the
Senior Trustee's fees and costs, instead merely noting that New York
law would govern the enforcement and interpretation of the agreement's
1
terms. 3

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
156 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1116-17.
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When the debtor thereafter filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code, both the Senior Trustee and the Junior Trustees filed
proofs of claim as unsecured nonpriority claims on behalf of their holders
in the debtor's Chapter 7 proceedings.3 5 Pursuant to the orders of the
bankruptcy court, the debtor distributed amounts sufficient to satisfy the
principal on the Senior Notes and all interest that accrued on the Senior
Notes prior to the petition date.136 Because the debtor's estate was
insolvent, however, the Senior Trustee did not receive any of the
interest
13 7
that had accrued on the Senior Notes after the petition date.
In view of the foregoing, holders of the Senior Notes commenced a
proceeding to compel the payment of postpetition interest until the date
of payment on the Senior Notes (including interest upon that interest),
as well as reimbursement of the Senior Trustee's fees and costs
associated with the action, from the distributions otherwise payable to
holders of the Subordinated Notes. In support of this request, the Senior
Trustee and note holders relied on contractual language in the Subordinated Indentures subordinating the junior note holders' rights to those
of the Senior Note holders, as well as to section 510(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which provides for the enforcement of subordination agreements.136 All parties moved for summary judgment.'39
The bankruptcy court denied the Senior Trustee's and note holders'
motion for summary judgment in part, and granted the Junior Trustees'
cross-motion for summary judgment in part. 4 ' The Senior Trustee
and holders of the Senior Notes appealed to the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, but the district court affirmed the judgment
of the bankruptcy court.' Both the bankruptcy court and the district
court based their holdings on the judicially-created doctrine of the rule
of explicitness, which effectively prevents a senior creditor from
recovering postpetition interest from junior creditors unless the
subordination agreement articulates the obligation in unusually clear

135. Id. at 1117.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. As part of its comprehensive 1978 revision of the bankruptcy laws, Congress
enacted a code provision allowing for the legal enforcement of subordination agreements
in bankruptcy courts: "A subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title

to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy
law."
11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1994).
139. 156 F.3d at 1117.

140. Id. at 1118 (citing In re Southeast Banking Corp., 188 B.R. 452 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1995)).
141. Id. (citing In re Southeast Banking Corp., 212 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997)).
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terms.'4 2 Applying the same logic, the bankruptcy and district courts
also denied the Senior Trustee's claim for reasonable costs and fees,
including attorney fees, incurred after the petition date.'" Finally,
relying on New York law that made a contract for compound interest
unenforceable, prevailing at the time the parties entered the relevant
contracts, the bankruptcy and district courts also rejected the Senior
Trustee's and holders of the Senior Notes' claims for compound interest
(interest upon the postpetition interest).'"
On further appeal, the court of appeals acknowledged the traditional
governance of a rule of explicitness, severely restricting a senior
creditor's ability to recover postpetition interest from junior creditors. 45 At the same time, however, the panel in Southeast Banking
noted that section 510(a)'s instruction to enforce subordination agreements on a par with other contracts under nonbankruptcy law constituted a plain departure from the prior practice of enforcing and interpreting
those agreements pursuant to the bankruptcy courts' equitable
powers.'" -Thus, in the wake of that section's inclusion within the
Bankruptcy Code, the equitable underpinnings relied upon to fashion
this rule of explicitness no longer existed. 14' In keeping with the
mandate of section 510 and the indentures' choice of law provision, the
question of what language had to be included in the agreement to alert
junior debenture holders that they were subordinating their claims to
senior holders' claims for interest was certified to the New York Court
of Appeals.'
In all other respects, the judgment of the district court
49
was reversed.
XII.

HENRY LEE Co. v. TOLZ

In its eleventh bankruptcy decision of the year, Henry Lee Co. v.
Tolz, 5° the circuit settled a priority battle under Florida's version of
the Uniform Commercial Code. The Chapter 7 trustee sought recovery
of funds held by a bank pursuant to a writ of garnishment obtained by
the judgment creditor within ninety days of filing. Notwithstanding the

142.
143.
144.
145.
1974)).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1119-20 (citing In re Time Sales Fin. Corp., 491 F.2d 841, 844 (3d Cir.
Id. at 1120-21.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1126.
157 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 1998).
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fact that a trustee in bankruptcy, as a hypothetical lien holder, takes
priority over those holding an unperfected security interest in the assets
of the debtor, the creditor claimed that its lien had priority under
Florida law because a judgment creditor may obtain priority by
delivering the writ of execution to the sheriff for the county where the
property is located.' 5' Noting, however, that a security interest in
money can only be perfected under the UCC by possession, the
bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for the trustee.'5 2 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

affirmed. 153
On further appeal, the court of appeals first observed that nothing
excludes garnishments from the perfection requirements of the Uniform
Commercial Code.' 5 Furthermore, because the collateral to be secured
was not a right represented by a judgment, but instead consisted of
funds contained in a bank account, that interest could only be perfected
by possession of the subject funds. 5 ' However, the creditor had not
obtained possession of the funds prior to commencement of the ninetyday period of presumptive insolvency, meaning that the trustee had a
priority interest therein.'56 For this reason, 'the decisions of the
district and bankruptcy courts
to permit the trustee's recovery under 11
157
U.S.C. § 544 were affirmed.
XIII.

PUGH V. BROOK

In Pugh v. Brook,' the Eleventh Circuit answered the question of
whether Bankruptcy Code provisions establishing time limits for actions
to avoid prepetition and postpetition transactions constitute waivable
statutes of limitation or jurisdictional bars. The debtors in Pugh had
filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 relief on September 27, 1991,
in an effort to prevent an impending foreclosure sale of their chicken
ranch in Plant City, Florida. Although the schedules of assets and
liabilities accompanying that filing did not adequately disclose an
unliquidated breach of contract claim that they held at the time,
subsequent to converting their case voluntarily to one of liquidation
under Chapter 7 on February 5, 1992, the debtors filed amended

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 1291.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1292.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 679.304(1) (1997)).
Id.

157. Id.
158.

158 F.3d 530 (11th Cir. 1998).
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schedules reporting the litigation claim as an asset of undetermined
value. They then reached an agreement with the Chapter 7 trustee
whereby the estate would receive seventy percent of the net proceeds of
any settlement of that claim, and the debtors would receive the
remaining thirty percent of such funds.'5 9
Notwithstanding their agreement to the contrary, upon settling their
breach of contract action for $63,310.80, the debtors presented the
trustee with only $13,400 of those settlement proceeds. This led the
trustee to commence an adversary proceeding on July 21, 1995, wherein
he sought turnover of those proceeds pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542(b), as
well as certain additional relief. On September 18, 1995, the debtors
filed an answer which did not include a statute of limitations defense." 6 Thereafter, disposing of the case on the merits, the bankruptcy court entered a final judgment in favor of the trustee in the amount
of $44,317.56.161
The debtors appealed the bankruptcy court's judgment, arguing for the
first time on appeal that the trustee was barred by 11 U.S.C. § 546 from
commencing or maintaining the adversary proceeding against them. In
response, the trustee argued that by failing to raise the two-year statute
of limitations contained in either 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a) or 549(d) in their
answer, the debtors had waived any and all such defenses. 2 Agreeing
with the trustee, the district court found that the two code sections
presented waivable statutes of limitation rather than nonwaivable
jurisdictional bars."6 Because the debtors had waived their statute of
limitations defense by not including it in their answer, the district court
found them to be barred from raising such questions on appeal and
affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court.'4
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted a division of authority
regarding the true nature of the time limitations in sections 546 and
549.'" Essentially, the court in Pugh noted that this distinction
reflected a divided view on whether the sections themselves represent a
jurisdictional grant such that parties may not avoid the limitations
posed thereunder by acts of waiver."6 In the court's view, this form

159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 530-31.
Id. at 531.
Id. (citing Brook v. Pugh (In re Pugh), 195 B.R. 787 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996)).
Id. at 532.

163. Id.
164. Id. (citing In re Pugh, 202 B.R. 792, 795-96 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996)).
165. Id. at 533-34.
166. Id. at 533. Specifically, the court in Pugh observed:
The bipolar split of authority that has developed among these courts can be
conceptualized in different ways. For example, we could view this split as a
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of jurisdiction-based analysis offended reason, as well as legislative
history suggesting that sections 546 and 549 set forth true statutes of
limitation. 167 The court in Pugh, therefore, found the time limitation
imposed under those sections to be waivable statutes of limitation, not
jurisdictional bars, and it consequently affirmed the district and
bankruptcy courts on that basis."

dispute over whether these code provisions constitute statutes of repose or

statutes of limitations. See Frascatorev. Secretary of HUD (In re Frascatore),98
B.R. 710, 718-19 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); cf Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross,
992 F.2d 298, 301 (l1th Cir. 1993) (explaining that, while a statute of limitations
is contingent, a statute of repose is absolute in that it "destroys the previously
existing rights so that, on the expiration of the statutory period, the cause of
action no longer exists" (quoting Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844, 845, 426 S.E.2d
870, 871-72 (1993))). Alternatively, we could consider whether the provisions are
"substantive" (also called "jurisdictional") or "procedural" statutes of limitations.
See Bartlik v. United States Dep't of Labor, 62 F.3d 163, 166 n.1 (6th Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (citing Martin v. FirstNat'l Bank of Louisville (In re Butcher), 829 F.2d
596,600 (6th Cir. 1987); Rust v. Quality Car Corral,Inc., 614 F.2d 1118, 1119 (6th
Cir. 1980)); cf. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 425-27 & n.2
(1965), rev'g 332 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1964) (noting that "the 'substantive'-procedural' distinction would seem to be of little help in deciding questions of extending
the limitation period"). It is more conducive to reasoned analysis, however, to
conceptualize this split as a disagreement over whether these code provisions
constitute grants of subject matter jurisdiction that leave a court without any
authority to hear certain proceedings-i.e., that extinguish the right of action itself
by divesting a court of its subject matter jurisdiction over certain proceedings-after the limitations period has elapsed, or whether they are true statutes
of limitations that restrict the power of a court to grant certain remedies in a
proceeding over which it has subject matter jurisdiction. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed.
Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998); Midstate HorticulturalCo. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
320 U.S. 356, 358-59 (1943); WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW
AND PRACTICE § 4:1 (2d ed. 1991). Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by waiver, see Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982), the debtors would prevail under the former
interpretation; the latter interpretation, on the other hand, would support the
trustee's argument that the debtors waived their statute of limitations defense by
failing to assert it in their September 1995 filing. See FED. R. CrV. P. 8(c);
American Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 1528, 1537 (11th Cir.
1983).

158 F.3d at 533-34.
167. 158 F.3d at 538 (citing S. REP. No. 95-988 at 87 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5873 ("Subsection (c) [enacted as (a)] adds a statute of limitations to
the use by the trustee of the avoiding powers.")).
168. Id.
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COMMUNITY BANK OF HOMESTEAD V. TORCISE

In Community Bank of Homestead v. Torcise (In re Torcise),16 9 the
Eleventh Circuit navigated the often tortuous intersection of collateral
estoppel and bankruptcy. The underlying saga began in April 1989
when Community Bank of Homestead, Florida loaned the debtor $1.5
million for use in his tomato farming operations, with the loan being
secured by a lien on certain real property and farm equipment. The
debtor made no payments on the loan before filing for Chapter 11
bankruptcy relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Florida in late November 1989.170 As part of that
case's disposition, the bankruptcy court approved a liquidation plan that
required the debtor to sell the farm equipment securing Community
Bank's loan, and then lifted the automatic
stay to allow Community
17 1
Bank to foreclose on the real property. '
In the course of a resulting judicial foreclosure, the Circuit Court of
Dade County, Florida, held the debtor liable for the principal amount of
the note, plus interest accruing at the contractual default rate until the
time of the foreclosure, and entered judgment for that amount, plus
postjudgment interest at the Florida statutory rate of twelve percent per
annum.' 2 The debtor did not appeal the state court's
judgment, and
7
a foreclosure sale of the real property was closed.'
The mortgagee then moved the bankruptcy court for release of the
proceeds from an escrow account where they had been placed pending
the resolution of certain ancillary litigation between it and the estate.7 4 Over the debtor's objection, the bankruptcy court approved
payment of the mortgagee's claim as provided in the state court
foreclosure judgment, precipitating an appeal to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.' 5 Concurring in
the debtor's analysis of state law, the district court held the circuit
court's foreclosure judgment had imposed "interest on interest" in
violation of Florida law.' 6 Furthermore, the district court viewed 11
U.S.C. § 506(b) as requiring the calculation of both prejudgment and

169. 162 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1998).
170. Id. at 1085-86.
171. Id. at 1086.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing Community Bank of Homestead v. Torcise (In re Torcise), 187 B.R. 18,
23 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)).
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postjudgment interest awards at the contract rate (rather than the
respective default or Florida statutory rates).'77 Thus, the court
reversed the bankruptcy court's ruling. 7 '
When the mortgagee sought further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
deemed any contention that Florida law does not permit interest on
interest to be an argument that should have been made in the circuit
court foreclosure proceeding. 179 Likewise, according to the court in
Torcise, if 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) were relevant in determining the amount
of Community Bank's claim, that argument should have been made in
the state court. 80 To the extent the debtor had failed to address such
questions as part of the foreclosure proceeding, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the amount of interest awarded on the mortgagee's claim in
postconfirmation state court foreclosure proceedings had a collateral
estoppel effect, barring the debtor from contesting calculation of interest
in the bankruptcy court.' 8 '
XV

UNITED STATES V. HAAS

The last of the Eleventh Circuit's 1998 opinions having material
bearing upon bankruptcy practice and procedure, United States v. Haas
(In re Haas),8' raised the question of when and to what extent a plan
may modify employment tax claims against the debtor's estate. The
debtors in Haas filed their joint petition under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1991 on the eve of an involuntary sale of their home
to satisfy $68,000 of "responsible person" employment tax obligations
and $617,000 of income tax obligations arising from the operation of the
husband's legal practice."i s
At the time of filing, the debtors had assets with a total value of
$259,000, to which they added $71,600 during the pendency of the
Chapter 11 case.' 4 The bankruptcy court confirmed a plan of reorga-

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1086-87. So as to demonstrate the impropriety of such action, the panel in
Torcise explained:
By the district court's reasoning, if the bankruptcy court had granted relief from
the automatic stay for an injured party to pursue an auto accident claim in
Florida circuit court, the bankruptcy court could subsequently (when the injured
party attempted to collect on the judgment) decide that the circuit court had
improperly applied the Florida law of negligence.
Id. at 1087.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 162 F.3d 1087 (11th Cir. 1998).
183. Id. at 1088.
184. Id. at 1089.
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nization which provided that the $68,000 employment tax debt, a
priority claim that could not be discharged by operation of 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a), would be treated as a secured claim and paid from the $71,600
in funds on hand, thereby purportedly reducing the scope of any
corresponding secured tax claim upon the other $259,000 in assets to
$191,000.'8 Regarding the remainder of the income tax obligations,
the plan provided that such debts would be treated as unsecured. While
the secured portion of the income tax claim was to be paid in installments over a thirty-year period with eight percent interest, only $10,000
would be paid upon the portion of such taxes deemed unsecured; beyond
tax claim was
such limited distribution, the remainder of the unsecured
186
to be discharged by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d).
Relying upon United States v. Energy Resources, Inc., i17 the debtors
in Haas asserted that their immediate satisfaction of the employment
taxes liability from funds on hand qualified as a permissible allocation
of plan payments. 1 The bankruptcy court concurred in this estimation of governing law, and confirmed the plan over the objection of the
Internal Revenue Service.' 89 On appeal, the District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama affirmed."9 Thereafter, the IRS sought
further appeal in the Eleventh Circuit.' 9'
The court of appeals began its resolution of the issues presented in
that appeal by distinguishing Energy Resources to the extent that the
reasoning contained therein merely permitted a trustee to direct the
application of initial plan payments to such trust fund taxes when the
underlying plan effected a full payment of all tax liabilities of the
Furthermore, the court in Haas observed that nothing in
estate."
Energy Resources suggested that the plan might fail subsequent to
confirmation.'93
Turning to the case at bar, the panel in Haas noted that the marginal
payment offered to the IRS reduced its recovery by $68,000, effectively

185. Id.

186. Id.
187. 495 U.S. 545 (1990). In Energy Resources, the Supreme Court concluded that a
bankruptcy court has the authority to order the IRS to treat tax payments made by a
Chapter 11 debtor corporation as reducing trust fund liabilities when the bankruptcy court
determines that the designation by the plan proponent is necessary for the success of a
reorganization plan. Id. at 550.
188. 162 F.3d at 1089.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1090.
191. Id. at 1088.
192. Id. at 1089.
193. Id.
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undermining that claim's priority status. 194 Furthermore, in contrast
to Energy Resources, the Haas plan had little likelihood of success
because it presupposed that the sixty-eight-year-old debtor husband
would continue to practice law for the next thirty years.'95 In the
Eleventh Circuit's view, the unrealistic nature of such a premise
destined the plan to fail, in violation of the feasibility requirements
imposed by Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a)(11). 196 Thus, the order
of confirmation was reversed, and the case was remanded for further
disposition in light of the panel's ruling.'97
XVI.

CONCLUSION

To varying degrees, the foregoing opinions from the 1998 calendar year
maintain the Eleventh Circuit's central role in the resolution of
bankruptcy-related disputes and the continued development of case law
in this area. Both practitioners and judges will benefit substantially
from the clarifications provided in these decisions, and other courts of
appeals most assuredly will look to their well-reasoned terms in settling
related bankruptcy disputes. The fine judicial effort reflected by these
decisions warrants commendation, and its character should lead those
within the bankruptcy bench and bar to eagerly anticipate what 1999
portends for Eleventh Circuit bankruptcy jurisprudence.

194. As the court in Haas noted in this regard:
If we adopted the debtors' approach in this case we would essentially be ruling
that when a creditor takes a lien to secure debt which Congress has classified as
priority, the creditor has forfeited the protection Congress has specifically assigned
to that debt to the extent the debt exceeds the value of the property subject to the
security interest. Thus, to the extent the debt is under-secured, the creditor
receives less protection than Congress intended.
Id. at 1089-90.
195. Id. at 1090.
196. Id. Among its other preconditions, the Bankruptcy Code directs that no Chapter
11 plan shall be confirmed unless such confirmation is "not likely to be followed by
liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11)
(1994).
197. 162 F.3d at 1090.

